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Reconstituting sentencing policy in the
Republic of Ireland
DR Liz CAMPBELL
School of Law, University of Aberdeen
Introduction
T he latter part of the twentieth century heralded an exponential increase in crime rates
in the Republic of Ireland1 and a concomitant burgeoning of political and popular
dissatisfaction with the apparent inability of the criminal justice system to prosecute
successfully and punish adequately those responsible for such criminality. To this end,
alterations to all aspects of the criminal process have been implemented so as to augment
the powers of the Irish state, from investigation and pre-trial procedure,2 during the trial
itself,3 through to the post-trial setting. This article focuses on a number of statutory
changes in the last context (post-trial), developments which signify a drift away from
customary norms of flexibilit3, proportionality and judicial discretion. However, despite
statutory incursions, the interpretation of these measures by the Irish judiciary, based on the
existing constitutional framework, offsets the punitive and pragmatic drive of the legislature
and may mitigate the potentially detrimental effects on the individual offender. Whether a
gap exists between the judicial dicta in the superior courts and the application of the law in
practice will be explored, as this may undermine the perspective of the courts as rights-
enforcers in the face of legislative adversity.
The traditional model of sentencing in Ireland
Traditionally, there have been few formal constraints on judicial discretion in sentencing in
Ireland,4 and the system in place is described as one of the most unstructured in common
law jurisdictions. 5 Sentencing decisions generally are based on a "disjointed 'instinctive
I While an average of 10.3 homicides were committed per year in the 1950s, this had risen to 60 in 2006. An
Garda Siochina, Annal Report of An Garda Siochdna 2006 (Dublin: Stationery Office, 2007), p. 20. For a
compilation of Irish crime statistics see I O'Donnell, E O'Sullivan and D Healy (eds) Crime and Punishment in
Ireland, 1922 to 2003: A stalistical sourcebook (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2005).
2 For example, police officers may issue their own warrants in certain instances; inferences may now be drawn
from silence; silence may be penalised; and lengthy detention periods have been sanctioned for a range of
scrious offences.
3 Bail may now be refused on preventative grounds and non-jury trials are held if the Director of Public
Prosecutions believes that the interests of justice so require.
4 T O'Malley, "Resisting the temptation of elegance: sentencing discretion reaffirmed" (1994) 4 Irish Criminal
Law Journal 1, 3.
5 T O'Malley, Sentendng Law and Practice (Dublin: Round Hall SAwect & Maxwell, 2000), p. 8.
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synthesis' approach", 6 in which all aspects of the offending behaviour and the offender's
circumstances are considered. 7 There are no sentencing guidelines, 8 and indeed such a
possibility in the context of rape trials was rejected in People (DPP) v Tiernan.9 Benefits and
disadvantages accrue from such a discretionary system: while it allows the individual
circumstances of each case to be considered, potential exists for disparity between
sentences, given that little firm guidance on the circumstances in which a particular sentence
is warranted exists. 10 Nevertheless, some general precepts have been developed: each
sentence must be formulated with the individual facts of the case in mind and must be
proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the circumstances of the perpetrator. In State
(Healy) v Donoghue, HenchyJ emphasised that a convicted offender must receive "a sentence
appropriate to his degree of guilt and his relevant personal circumstances". 11 Although the
word proportionality is not mentioned explicitly, subsequent judgments have interpreted
this dictum as if it is12 and the principle of proportionality has been described as "a well-
established tenet of Irish constitutional law". 13
Legislative alterations to post-conviction policy
Significant amendments to sentencing policy and practice in Ireland have been heralded by
the introduction of presumptive sentences, prosecution "appeals" against unduly lenient
sentences, and a range of post-conviction orders which relate to confiscation of property
and monitoring of persons. The effect of such changes is to undo conventional approaches
to sentencing by limiting the discretion of judges, and to shift subtly, yet undeniably, the
focus from the convicted individual to the needs of the state. However, the reception of the
courts to such tactics and the constitutional framework in place has tempered the potentially
dramatic consequences of these changes.
PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCES
A presumptive minimum sentence was first introduced in Ireland by the Criminal Justice Act
1999 for drug-possession with intent to supply. While a mandatory life sentence for murder
was already on the statute book,14 presumptive sentences were unprecedented. Section 4 of
the 1999 Act provides that any person convicted of possessing drugs with a value of at least
€13,000 with intent to supply shall receive a term of imprisonment for life or less, with ten
years the minimum time to be served unless there are exceptional and specific circumstances
which would make this unjust. The "exceptional circumstances" caveat permits the exercise
6 S Kilcommins, I O'Donnell, E O'Sullivan and B Vaughan, Crime, Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland
(Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2004), p. 145.
7 R v Filliscroft [1975] VR 292 at 300.
8 See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (November 2006), §3E1.1. Moreover, in England
and Wales the Sentencing Guidelines Council may issue guidelines under s. 170 of the Criminal Jusncc
Act 2003.
9 People (DPP) v Tieran [1988] IR 250.
10 T O'Malley, "Principled discretion: towards the development of a sentencing canon" (2001) 7:3 Bar
Retiew 135.
11 State (Heal) v Donohue [1976] IR 325 at 353.
12 T O'Mallcy, Sentendag Law and Practice 2nd edn (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2006). Sec, e.g. Cox v Ireland
[19921 2 IR 503 at 524; People (DPP) v A1 [19941 2 ILRM 541 at 547; DPP v II C [19941 1 ILRM 321 at 325;
People (DPP) v llcormack [2000] 4 IR 356 at 359.
13 Rock v Ireland [1997] 3 IR 484 at 500.
14 CriminalJustice Act 1990, .2.
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of the court's discretion in certain instances, thereby insulating the provisions from
constitutional challenge on the basis that the sentence imposed was disproportionate.
15
The prescribed maximum and minimum sentences are "clear and definite guidance"'
16
which should only be departed from for good reason, 17 and the "very draconian penalties"
were seen to reflect the legislature's view on the gravity of such offences. 18 It has become
apparent that the exceptional circumstances caveat has been applied in the majority of
cases, 19 where factors such as the accused's minor role as a courier,20 poor health,
2 1
psychiatric history,22 limited intellectual capacity, the effect of remand imprisonment in a
foreign country, co-operation with the police,23 and successful progress in a drug
rehabilitation programme24 have been taken into account.25 Nevertheless, the courts have
not declined to impose a sentence above the minimum where the circumstances and severity
of the offence, including the sophistication of drug dealing,2 6 the amount and value of the
drugs, 27 previous criminal career, and failure to cooperate with the police, 28 necessitated
such a response. Notwithstanding this, the popular and political perception is that the ten-
year sentence in the Criminal Justice Act 1999 is circumvented frequently by overly lenient
judges29 who are criticised for failing to act "in the spirit of the legislation". 30
Since the 1999 Act, the presumptive sentence, a "revolutionary alteration superimposed
on the conventional principles of sentencing", 31 has transfixed the Irish legislature as an
apposite means of dealing with serious criminality. The Criminal Justice Act 2006 provides,
inter alia, that the offender need not know the value of the drugs;32 it extends the
presumptive minimum sentence to cover drugs importation 33 and firearms offences, 34 and
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years for a second drug offence. 35 In
addition, the Criminal Justice Act 2007 introduces a type of "mandatory" sentence for
15 O'Malley, Sentencing Law and Practice (2000), p. 102.
16 People (DPP) v Botha [20041 2 IR 375 at 384.
17 People (DPP) v Heffernan, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 October 2002 per Hardiman J.
18 DPPv Henry, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 May 2002.
19 Research carried out for the Deparmient of Justice on drug supply trials from November 1999 to May 2001
indicates that, of the 55 cases studied, the presumptive minimum sentence was imposed in only three
instances. P McEvoy, Research for the Department of Jnstice on the Criteria appled by the Courts in Sentening under s.
15A of the Misuse of Drgs Act 1977 (as amended) (15 February 2005), p. 8.
20 Botha [2004] 2 IR 375.
21 Ibid. Also People (DPP) v VIardacardis, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 20 January 2003.
22 People (DPP) v Benjamin, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 14January 2002.
23 People (DPP) vAlexou [2003] 3 IR 513 at 523.
24 People (DPP) v McGin ,, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 April 2006.
25 Indeed, suspended sentences have been imposed, such as in Alexiou [20031 3 IR 513 and AcGin y, unreported,
Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 April 2006.
26 People (DPP) v Byrne [2003] 4 IR 423
27 DPP v Long, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 7 April 2006.
28 People (DPP) v Dncque, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 July 2005; People (DPP) v McDonald,
unreported, Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, 8 June 2005.
29 "Mandatory drug offence terms rarely imposed", Irish Times, 7 March 2006, p. 6.
30 Dai Debates, 28 November 2006, vol. 628, col. 905 per Mr Kelleher.
31 DPP v Dermody, unreported, Court of Cnriinal Appeal, 21 December 2006.
32 S. 82(3).
33 S. 86.
34 ('riminal Justice Act 2006, s. 42, 57-60. The exceptional circumstances caveat also applies.
35 S. 4(dl
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second offences such as murder, false imprisonment,36 firearms offences, 37 aggravated
burglary,38 and drug trafficking.39 Nevertheless, subs. (3), which was inserted as the 2007
Bill progressed through the Irish legislature, states that such a sentence shall not be imposed
where it would be disproportionate in all the circumstances of the case. This may safeguard
the "two strikes" provision in the 2007 Act from challenge on the ground that it limits
unduly the constitutional right to proportionality in sentencing,40 a challenge which, if
successful, would render the provision invalid.4 1 This encapsulates the tension between the
legislature's urge to limit proportionality and judicial discretion and the constitutional
framework which compromises and mitigates this aim.
PROSECUTION REFERRAL OF SENTENCE
Further encroachment on courts' sentencing remit is evinced in the ability of the Director
of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to refer unduly lenient sentences for review to the Court of
Criminal Appeal under s. 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. This measure, modelled on
s. 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in England and Wales, 42 was prompted by a number
of controversial cases in which the sentence handed down was deemed by political and
popular opinion to be inconsistent with the gravity of the offence.43
As the court in People (DPP) v Egan emphasised, the DPP's power "trenches upon the
general right of a convicted person to presume that the sentence he receives from the trial
judge is final unless he appeals it himself"; 44 thus certain criteria delineated by the courts
limit this power. The DPP bears the onus of proof to demonstrate that the sentence is
unduly lenient, 45 and considerable weight should be given to the reasons of the trial judge
for imposing the sentence, given that the judge "receives the evidence at first hand". 46 The
36 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, s. 15.
37 Firearms Acts 1925-1964.
38 Crminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, .. 13.
39 Criminal Justice Act 1994, s. 3(1). The precursor for such a punitive measure, which impacts considerably on
judicial discretion and may disregard the individual characteristics of the accused, is evident in "three strikes"
provisions in American states which impose an automatic life sentence on persons convicted of a third felony.
California's "three strikes" laws were upheld in Ewing v Cahfornia (2003) 538 US 11, where a 5:4 majority of
the Supreme Court found that a sentence of 25 years to life for the felony theft of golf clubs did not violate
the US Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
40 Before the Irish President signed the Bill into law on 9 May 2007, she convened a meeting of the Council of
State to determine if the Bill should be referred to the Supreme Court for consideration but decided not to
do so. Art. 26 of the Constitution allows a Bill to be referred to the Supreme Court to determine its
compatibility with the Constitution, and, according to the terms of Art. 34.3, approval by the Supreme Court
insulates that provision from future challenge. See "President McAleese signs Criminal Justice Bill into law",
Irish Times, 10 May 2007, p. 1.
41 Art. 15.4.2.
42 S. 36 provides that if it appears to the Attorney General that the sentence of a person in a proceeding in the
Crown Court is unduly lenient, and the offence is triable only on indictment, he or she may refer the case to
the Court of Appeal for review of the sentence. The Court of Appeal may quash the sentence and pass such
sentence as it deems appropriate.
43 The first of these cases was People (DPP) v IF"C [1994] 1 ILRM 321, which involved a nine-year suspended
sentence for a guilty plea to a rape charge. The victim renounced her anonymity to express her belief that the
sentence imposed was too lenient. See T O'Malley, "Prosecution appeals against sentence" (1993) lash Law
Times 121.
44 People (DPP) v Egan [2001] 2 ILRM 299 at 308, following People (DPP) v Connolly, unreported, Court of
Criminal Appeal, 25 November 1996.
45 People (DPP) v Byrne [1995] 1 ILRM 279 at 287.
46 Ibid. at 287. See T O'Malley, "The first prosecution appeal against sentence" (1994) 4 Irish Cnminal Li'
Journal 192.
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intervention of the appeal court is warranted only if there is "a clear divergence by the court
of trial from the norm . caused by an obvious error in principle".
47 Though the
strengthening of the prosecution's power evinces a perceptible shift in the traditional
balance between the state and the accused and betrays the desire of the legislature to limit
judicial autonomy, the strict rules in place offset the effects on this provision on judicial
discretion. Moreover, although referral appears to bear repercussions for the constitutional
right against double jeopardy,48 this line of argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in
People (DPP) v Heeney,49 following (although not citing) the majority of the US Supreme
Court in United States v DiFrancesco.
50
ANCILLARY POST-CONVICTION ORDERS
A number of legislative provisions allow for post-conviction orders to be imposed,
concerning property forfeiture and the monitoring of prisoners upon release.
Property may be confiscated after an individual has been convicted of certain crimes,
according to the terms of the Criminal Justice Act 1994. Section 4 (as amended) requires a
court to consider imposing a confiscation order where the offender has been convicted on
indictment for a drug-trafficking offence and, if the court determines on the balance of
probabilities that the offender has benefited from drug trafficking, it must make a
confiscation order requiring the offender to pay the value of the proceeds of the criminality.
51
There is a statutory presumption that any property received by the respondent in the six years
prior to conviction constitutes the proceeds of drug trafficking.52 Similarly, s. 9 provides that
a confiscation order may be made requiring a convicted person who has benefited from an
offence other than drug trafficking to pay the value of the property so obtained. This is not
a mandatory order, but may be imposed by the court upon application by the DPP.
A post-conviction requirement for sexual offenders in particular is contained in Pt 2 of
the Sex Offenders Act 2001, which imposes a duty on a convicted sex offender to notify
the Gardai of name, address and any change thereof.53 Akin to this, Pt 9 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2006 requires police notification for persons convicted and imprisoned for drug
trafficking. Such an offender must inform the police within seven days of conviction of any
names or nicknames and home address,5 4 after release must inform them of matters such
47 People (DPP) v McCor,ack [2000] 4 IR 356 at 359.
48 Art. 38.1 of the Irish Constitution.
49 People (DPP) v Heeney [20011 1 IR 736, at 739-40.
50 United States v DiFrancesco (1980) 449 US 117.
51 In People (DPP) v Gilligans, unreported, Special Criminal Court, 22 March 2002, O'Donovan J stated that such
a determination involved five matters: the cost to the plaintiff of purchasing drugs; the amount of drugs
involved in the plaintiff's drug-trafficking activities; the expense of the shipment, sale and distribution of such
drugs; the consideration received by the plaintiff when disposing of those drugs; and the net profit accruing
to the plaintiff as a result of his drug-trafficking activities. Although the Supreme Court later held that the
Special Criminal Court did not have jurisdiction to impose confiscation orders in Gilhgan v Special Criminal
Cort, unreported, Supreme Court. 21 December 2005, para. 6.3, it is useful to see the factors that were
considered by the trial court.
52 Criminal Justice Act 1994, s. 5(4)(ti). The Irish Law Reform Commission recommended the adoption of such
a presumption. Law Reform Commission, Report on the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (LRC 35-1991), p. 75.
A similar provision in s. 3(2) of the Proceeds of Crime (Scotland) Act 1995 was ultimately found to be ECHR-
compliant in McIntosh, Petitioner (2001) SC (PC) 89, while, in R v Befyafield [2()03] 1 AC 1099, the Housc of
L.ords held that statutory assumptions in s. 72AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and s. 4(3) of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994 wcrc not disproportionate so as to breach Convention rights.
53 A register of convicted sex offenders was first introduced in the United States in the early 19 9 0s. The Jacob
Wetterling Crimes against Childrcn and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act 1994 required all states in
the US to implement a sex offenders' register.
54 Criminal justice Act 2006, . 92(l).
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any change of address, 55 and of any intention to leave the state. 56 A comparable
development is the inclusion of monitoring orders in s. 26(2) of the Criminal Justice Act
2007, for persons convicted of certain offences, including murder, false imprisonment, 57
firearms offences, 58 drug trafficking,59 and organised crime offences.60 The order, which
lasts for at most seven years, requires the individual to notify in writing a police inspector
of his or her address and any proposed absence from there for more than seven days.
Failure to comply with either provision is an offence.61
These post-conviction ancillary orders potentially affect the right to proportionality in
sentencing, by the imposition of an order supplementary to a term of imprisonment.
However, when confiscation was challenged in Gilligan v Special Criminal Court on the basis
that it constituted a de facto penalty imposed after a criminal procedure,62 this argument
was rejected by the High Court, where McCracken J stressed that the relevant section does
not purport to create a criminal charge, nor does it require the court to find that the person
committed any offence other than that for which he or she was convicted. The making of
an order did not involve the imposition of a punishment 63 but rather sought to recover the
value of the benefits gained through drug trafficking.64 McCracken J stressed that the
amount to be recovered is limited to the amount of benefit received by the defendant and
also by the defendant's means, so that the defendant cannot be ordered to make a payment
without the means to do so, in contrast to financial penalties imposed for criminal offences
which are absolute, irrespective of the defendant's resources. Moreover, the payment of the
amount benefited from drug trafficking does not absolve the individual from liability for the
offence. Thus, the courts found that the confiscation order did not engage or offend the
right to proportionality.
As regards the constraining of the court's discretion, s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act
1994 (as amended) imposes a mandatory requirement on the court to consider a
confiscation order for drug-trafficking offences and so seems to impinge on judicial choice.
As initially enacted, s. 4 required the court to consider a confiscation order only where the
DPP entered an application expressing suspicion that the accused had benefited from the
sale and supply of drugs. The subsequent amendment by the 1999 Act has not been
challenged nor would it be found to impinge unjustifiably on judicial independence in
sentencing, following Deaton v Attorney General which permits mandatory sentences but
limits any choice in determining sentence from a selection to the judiciary.65
Whether notification requirements affect the right to proportionality adversely is also
unlikely, given extant constitutional jurisprudence. The constitutionality of Pt 2 of the 2001
Act was unsuccessfully challenged in Enght v Ireland, where Geoghegan J stressed that the
registration requirement does not constitute a penalty66 and is a proportionate measure to
55 S. 92.
56 S. 92(3) and (4).
57 Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, s. 15.
58 Firearms Acts 1925-1964.
59 Criminal justice Act 1994, . 3.
60 Criminal Justice Act 2006, ss. 71-3.
61 S. 94 and s. 25(16).
62 Gilligan v Special Crnminal Court, unreported, High Court, 8 November 2002.
63 Murp,, v GA1 [2001] 4 IR 113. Gilgan v CriminalAssets Bureau [1998] 3 IR 185.
64 Gilligan, unreported, High Court, 8 November 2002.
65 Deaton v Attorne, General [19631 IR 170 at 182.
66 Eunght v Ireland [20031 2 IR 321 at 337. A comparable decision was reached in the context of the ECHR n
Ibbotson v UK (1999) 27 EHRR (CD) 332.
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protect the rights of other citizens. 67 The notification requirements in Pt 9 of the 2006 Act
and Pt 2 of the Sex Offenders Act 2001 are comparable, and indeed, as Garland notes,
governments are on a "war footing" with respect to drug trafficking and sex offending,
68
explaining why similar approaches are adopted in both contexts. Therefore, it seems that the
imposition of notification requirements under the 2006 legislation similarly is not an
additional punishment for the accused, nor does it constitute a disproportionate response
to the issue of drug trafficking, given that the effects on the rights of the individual in
question are minor.
Explaining the changes
Various theoretical insights are relevant in assessing these post-conviction amendments, and
in unpicking the often divergent motivations of the legislature and the judiciary in Ireland.
Essentially, the Irish legislature seems to be driven by a risk averse and punitive logic, which
sees crime control as not only an overarching aim of but as the superior value in the
criminal justice system. Conversely, while the courts sometimes acquiesce in the objectives
of Parliament, in general they are motivated by contrasting norms which favour process and
individual liberty over consequentialist demands of crime control.
The classic work of Herbert Packer on two models of the criminal process, the criminal
control model and the due process model, is valuable in conceptualising the ideological
stimuli of the judicial and legislative arms of the Irish state. 69 Whereas the former is an
instrumental model which focuses on the effective control of crime, the latter emphasises
the potential for abuse in the criminal justice process and therefore advocates a series of
rights which protect the individual against the state. Although the due process model
recognises the need for crime control, it elevates the protection of the individual so as to
ensure that rights are not displaced by the desire to tackle crime 70 and, in contrast, the crime
control model favours the suppression of crime and the protection of the public.71
Packer argued that the validating authority of the crime control model is proximately
administrative and ultimately legislative whereas the due process model's validating authority
is judicial. 72 And, indeed, in Ireland the crime control model represents the ideological basis
for contemporary political discourse on crime, whereas due process norms provide the
inpetus for judicial rejection of some such tactics. The prevailing attitude in the political
sphere is that the Irish justice system is unjustifiably entrenched in the due process paradigm,
and pays scant regard to the imperatives of crime control. The former Minister for Justice
noted "that the balance has shifted too far in favour of the accused" 73 - a sentiment echoed
by senior police figures 74 - which is seen to warrant the "rebalancing" of the system.75
67 Enright [2003] 2 IR 321 at 343.
68 D Garland, The C/lture of Controk Crone and social order in contemporary societ
, 
(O xford: OUP, 2001), p. 172.
69 H Packer, The Lrits of the Climinal Sanction (California: Stanford Universitv Press, 1968). See E Campbell,
"Decline of due process in the Irish justice system: beyond the culture of control?" (2006) 6 Hibernian LJ 125.
70 Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (n. 69 above), p. 164.
71 Ibid., p. 158.
72 Ibid., p. 173.
73 Ddi/ Debates, 15 February 2005, vol. 597, col. 1276 per Minister for Justice, Mr McDowell.
74 President of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors, "Submission to the Joint Committee on
Justice, Fqualitv, Defence, and Women's Rights", 8 December 2003; "Garda chief warns on court
'imbalance"', Irish Tinjes, 23 March 2005, p. 4.
75 Department of Jusncc, Equality and Law Reform, "Rebalancing Criminal Justice - Remarks by Tanaiste in
Limerick" (speech), 20 October 2006; Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group (BCLRG), Final Report of
the Balance in the Criminal Lin Retnew Groip (Dublin: Stationery Office, 15 March 2007), p. 3; and Ddil Debates,
15 February 2005, vol. 597, col. 1276 per Minister for Jusnce.
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In addition to the imperative of crime control, recent legislative developments at the
post-trial stage of the criminal process belie the influence of the new penology - described
by Feeley and Simon as an emerging paradigm with revised discourses, objectives and
techniques 76 - which focuses on probability and risk and regards offenders as aggregates
rather than individuals.77 The focus is less on the responsibility, culpability and treatment of
offenders, but rather on managerial techniques to identify, categorise and organise groups
according to dangerousness and risk.78 The influence of the new penology is particularly
evident in the scheme of presumptive sentences in which the legislature seeks to subsume
individual characteristics to the classification of offenders into groups. 79 Moreover, like the
sex offenders' register which was conceived as a "tool for risk management" 80 and a means
of control,8 1 the notification requirements in the 2006 Act focus on the control of released
drug traffickers, rather than on rehabilitation or reform. Such an approach evinces a
growing belief that particular _Opes of criminal are not capable of reform, but rather retain
the potential to commit further criminal behaviour and so should be continuously surveyed.
Nevertheless, the approval by the courts of these tactics established their compliance with
domestic human rights norms and set them beyond constitutional challenge in future.
Building on the notion of a "new penology", Garland characterised certain criminal
justice measures as "adaptive responses" of the state to a perceived crisis in crime control.82
While he proffered examples in the US and UK, including improved caseload management,
systematic information-gathering, the development of a managerialist ethos and an
increased stress on incapacitation, the post-conviction orders imposed in Ireland also fit
into this schema, given that they provide the state with a supplementary means of dealing
with criminality beyond the confines of the traditional criminal justice realm. Indeed, the
judiciary has not displayed the same circumspection towards such orders, as in the context
of presumptive sentences and prosecution sentence referrals, and has acquiesced in this
approach to combating serious crime.
In addition to conceptualising these measures in an "adaptive" sense, they can be seen
to possess a more straightforward instrumental worth. Presumptive sentences are of
instrumental value in terms of incapacitation, given that they may seek to remove offenders
from society for a longer period than is normally imposed by the courts. Moreover, it was
argued (rather optimistically, it must be added) that the presumptive sentence in the
Criminal Justice Act 1999 would "eradicate" the illegal drugs trade, 83 while the presumptive
sentence for firearms offences in the 2006 Act would provide a "substantial deterrent".
84
Furthermore, the Minister for Justice in 2005 expressed his belief that the presumptive
sentence for drug possession has a benefit in terms of guilty pleas and the co-operation
received by the Garda Siochina from the offender in the hope of having the sentence
76 M Feeley and J Simon, "The new penology: notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its
implications" (1992) 30 Criminology 449; and M Feeley and J Simon, "Actuarial justice: the emerging criminal
law" in D Nelken (ed.), The Futures of Criminology (London: Sage, 1994), p. 185.
77 Feeley and Simon, "The new penology" (n. 76 above), pp. 449-50.
78 Ibid., p. 452.
79 Ibid., p. 461.
80 C White, "Controlling sex offenders: raising critical questions about the Sex Offenders Bill 2000" (2001) Irnb
Journal of Family Law 8, 11.
81 S Walsh, "Doing justice: recent developments in sentencing and rehabilitation of sex offenders" (2002) 12 mnsb
Criminal Law Journal 6.
82 Garland, The Culture of Control (n. 69 above), p. 113.
83 Ddil Debates, 21 April 1999, vol. 503, col. 838 per Minister for Justice, Mr O'Donoghue.
84 Departnent of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, "Minister announces 7% decrease in provisional headline
crime figures" (press release), 26 October 2004.
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reduced. 85 Notification requirements and monitoring orders also fulfil practical purposes.
By monitoring certain groups of offenders, the state seeks to prevent the commission of
crime, or if this is not possible, to ease its task in investigation by ensuring that the police
are furnished with sufficient information to track the movements of ex-convicts.
Presumptive sentences and post-conviction orders serve a symbolic end, indicating
society's view of particular offences. As Garland notes, the symbolic, expressive and
communicative aspects of penal sanctions seem to have become more significant in recent
years, and "[t]he emotional temperature of policy-making has shifted from cool to hot".
86
As sentencing involves a public statement about an offender and an offence,87 expressive
sanctions may relieve tension and serve as a cathartic and gratifying moment of unity in the
face of crime.88 Indeed, the "unequivocal" message that the original presumptive sentence
in the 1999 Act would send to criminals was emphasised in Parliament,89 as was its capacity
to demonstrate society's abhorrence of the trafficking of drugs.90 By prescribing a
minimum sentence, the legislature expresses its disapprobation of those crimes regarded as
most pernicious to society.
Similarly, the enactment of a sex offender register may be viewed as a political response
to mollify a fearful public, given that prior to the Bill's passing the Department of Justice
conceded that the police in effect already maintained a register of all persons convicted of
sexual offences.91 The additional obligation posed on sex offenders to inform the Gardai
of a change of address is of dubious effect in preventing the perpetration of a crime.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of the legislation was not questioned, politicians seemed
convinced of its importance, 92 and so this statute was enacted to alleviate the fears of the
public vis- -vis predatory sex offenders. A measure such as a register is designed to reassure
the public in a decisive manner, regardless of its substantive effectiveness.
The introduction of presumptive sentences and post-conviction orders demonstrates a
growing emphasis on the crime rather than on the particular offender. This focus on the
crime holds the potential to result in an abstract generalised judgment, which leads to bias
for more punitive sentences on protective, symbolic and condemnatory grounds.93 There is
a drift away from seeing proportionality as central to sentencing and an entrenchment of
scepticism towards the judiciary, encapsulated in the abiliry of the prosecution to refer
unduly lenient sentences to an appellate court. However, various legal and attitudinal factors
in place safeguard the freedom of choice of the courts in sentencing, and temper the
punitive consequences for the offender.
85 Minister for Justice, "Criminal Justice Bill 2004: ministerial presentation to the Joint Comrruttee on Justice,
Equalin', Defence and Women's Rights", 7 September 2005.
86 Garland, The Culture of Control (n- 69 above), pp. 10-11.
87 A Ashworth, Sentencing and Pubic Pohq
, 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), p. 111.
88 D Garland, "The culture of high crime societies: some preconditions of recent 'law and order' policies"
(2000) 40 Briisb Journal of Criminology 347, 350.
89 Ddil Debates, 21 April 1999, vol. 503, col. 837 per Minister for Justice, Mr O'Donoghue. Also Diil Debates,
1 July 1998, vol. 493, col. 883 per Minister for Justice, Mr O'Donoghue.
90 Ddil Debates, 21 April 1999, vol. 503, col. 787 per Minister for Justice, Mr O'Donoghue.
91 Dcpartment of Justice, Equalitr and Lau Reform, The Law on Se.xrl Offences: .1 discussion paper (Dubhn:
Stationery Office, 1998), p. 79.
92 Ddil Debates, 20 Nov 2001, vol. 544, col. 836; also 3 Oct 2001, vol. 541, col. 226
93 F Zimring, G Htawkins and S Kamm, Punishment and Democra,y: Three strikes and;ou're out in California (Ne,.
York: OUR 2000), pp. 199--200.
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The judicial bulwark
The constitutional structure in place in Ireland, coupled with the underlying ideology of
judicial decisions, has mitigated the effects of legislative incursions on conventional
approaches to sentencing. In contrast to Parliament, which seems increasingly propelled b%
crime control as a normative value, the High Court has stated that "the primary purpose [of
the Constitution] in the field of fundamental rights is to protect them from unjust laws
enacted by the legislature", 94 and by interpreting the Constitution in a way that may be
characterised as rights-enforcing, the courts are pitted against more results-oriented and
consequentialist politicians. This is exemplified by the comment of Denham J in the
Supreme Court that "the applicant's right to due process is a right inherent in the concept
of justice, which is at the core of the Constitution". 95
Under the Irish Constitution, any legislative measure that is found to conflict with the
Constitution is invalidated,96 in contrast to the scheme in the UK where the Human Rights
Act 1998 permits the courts to make merely a declaration of incompatibility.97 Any sentencing
provision which could impact on the constitutional right to proportionality runs the risk of
being deemed invalid, and this is the reason for the inclusion of the "exceptional
circumstances" provision in the Criminal Justice Acts 1999-2007. Therefore, while the
motivating aims of the legislature (including deterrence, the conveyance of disapproval and
the incapacitation of criminals) in devising such provisions have the potential to undermine
the determining principle of proportionality in sentencing, the exceptional circumstances
caveat has permitted the courts to circumvent the punitive intention of the legislature to a
certain extent and to withstand the drift towards a crime control model of criminal justice, by
ensuring that the rights and personal circumstances of the offender are adequately considered.
In addition to the concept of proportionality in sentencing, the broader notion of
independence counteracts the attempts of the legislature to intervene in judicial matters.
Independence in all aspects of the courts' duties is constitutionally enshrined, 98 and has
been described as the most significant aspect of the separation of powers in Ireland.99
While the dynamic between the judiciary and the legislature is a vital element of
democracy, recent years have seen increased criticism of the courts by politicians, such as
when the Minister for Justice stressed to the judiciary that the exceptional and specific
sentencing derogation should only be used in a "minority of cases", that the judiciary
should be influenced by the "political consensus" that "[d]rugs have such a dramatic effect
on the quality of life in our society, [that] a prisoner-focused sentencing policy ...is
mistaken when it goes too far", 100 that "the judicial arm of the State as well must play its
part in the suppression of gangland violence". 10 1 Further evidence of diminishing
legislative deference to the courts lies in the action of the Government Deputy Chief Whip
94 PHvMurp y [19871 IR 621.
95 People (DPP) v Gilligan, unreported, Supreme Court, 23 November 2005.
96 However, a presumption of consotutionality applies in the interpretation of legislation by the courts, and an
Act will be seen as valid if it is possible to construe it in accordance with the Constitution (see Pigs Mlarkehog
Board v Donnely [1939] IR 413; Buckley v Attorney General [1950] IR 67; East Donegal Co-Operative Livestock Mart
Lid v Attorney General 19701 IR 317).
97 S.4.
98 Art. 35.
99 D Gwynn Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland: The law of the execut'ie, legislature, and judicature (Dublin: Round
Hall Press, 1985), p. 188.
100 DdilDebates, 24 May 2006, vol. 620, col. 502 per Minister for Justice, Mr McDowell.
101 See "McDowell criticises bail law applicaton", Irish Times, 15 December 2006, p. 8.
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in writing to the President of the High Court about the high proportion of drug dealers
"escaping" the ten-year sentence. 102
In response, the Court of Criminal Appeal, in DPP v Dernody,103 claimed it paid such
political commentary "no attention whatever" and that the sentence has been "reasonably
successful in its operation". 104 Nevertheless, the associated coolness between the judiciary
and the Minister for Justice culminated in a boycott of a Christmas party held by the
Department of Justice by the vast majority of senior judges,105 indicating their distaste for
political intervention in what are construed as strictly judicial issues. Although criticism of
the court, or "even emphatic disagreement", has been seen as crucial in society given the
right to freedom of expression, 10 6 this increasing political intervention cannot amount to
anything more than posturing, given the constitutional rules in place.
In addition to the courts' opposition to a model of justice which favours crime control
at the expense of due process, the Constitution and ingrained judicial ideologies prelude the
adoption of risk-focused penologies which view offenders as aggregates. The significant
number of cases in which the presumptive minimum sentence has not been imposed
underlines the power of the courts to withstand actuarial rationales, by drawing on the
constitutional standard of proportionality. Whereas Feeley and Simon lament the
capitulation of the US courts in the actuarial approach, 107 the Irish courts seem to
withstand the managerial and risk-oriented approach of the legislature. 108
While the judiciary seems to temper the punitive legislative trend at the post-trial stage
of the criminal process, in fact, there is a predilection for the use of imprisonment, in
particular on behalf of the lower level courts. The numbers of prisoners on remand has
been "increasing steadily": 109 while there were 322 prisoners on remand on a given day in
2000, the number in 2001 was 458, while the increase continued to 488 on a particular day
in 2003 and 519 in 2006.110 Furthermore, the number of committals to prison has risen
from 10,658 committals in 2005 to 12,157 in 2006, and a considerable cohort of these
comprises short sentences. In 2005, from a total of 5088 sentences, 1962 were sentences of
less than three months and a further 1020 between three and six months; while, in 2006, a
total of 5802 sentences included 2253 sentences of less than three months and 1220
between three and six months. 111 This substantiates O'Donnell's claim that there is
"a strong orientation towards custody among Irish judges". 112 This preference for
102 "Courts pulled up for 'low' drug jail terms", Irish Independent, 13 November 2006.
103 DPP v Dermoy, unreported, Court of Crminal Appeal, 21 December 2006.
104 Sce McEvoy, Researrhfar the Department of Justice (n. 19 above), p. 11.
105 See "Judges boycott McDowell reception over bail comments", Irish Times, 22 December 2006, p. 1.
106 State (DPP) v lFaeh [19811 IR 412 at 421.
107 Feeley and Simon claim that US courts have used actuarial justice in preventative detention cases (Salerno v US
(1987) 481 US 739) and have sanctioned the use of profiles as a basis for detaining people. Feeley and Simon,
"Actuarial justice" (n. 76 above), p. 180.
108 Feeley and Simon, "Actuarial justice" (n. 76 above), p. 180.
109 Irish Prison Service, Report 1999 and 2000 (Dublin: Irish Prison Service, 2000), p. 10.
110 Irish Prison Scrvice, Annua/Report 2003 (Dublin: Irish Prison Service, 2004), p. 2 0 ; Irish Prison Service, Annual
Report 2006 (Dublin: Irish Prison Service, 2007) p. 16.
IlI Irish Prison Service, Annual Report 2005 (Dublin: Insh Prison Service, 2006), p. 12: Irish Prison Service, Innual
Rport 2006 (n. 110 above), p. 14.
112 1 O'Donnell, "Imprisonment and penal policy in Ireland" (2004) 43 Howard Journal253, 257.
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imprisonment is further evidenced in the fact that almost as many individuals are
imprisoned each year as are supervised in the community.113
Thus, characterising the judiciary as an impenetrable safeguard against legislative
incursions on norms of proportionality and restraint in the imposition of punishment is
unduly simplistic and neglects the punitive inclinations of some courts.
Conclusion
Alterations in the realm of sentencing in Ireland, and more generally at the post-conviction
stage of the criminal process, are indicative of the shift in focus away from the interests of
the individual towards the crime control-oriented needs of the state. Risk management and
the control of offenders, either by incapacitative sentences or through post-conviction
orders, have increased in significance. In addition, the expressive element of tactics such as
presumptive minimum sentences must not be overlooked, given their ability to convey the
disapprobation of policy makers and society in general. Moreover, the ability of the DPP
to appeal unduly lenient sentences enhances the capabilities of the state and shifts the
balance in its favour, while the imposition of confiscation orders exemplifies the adoption
of novel and adaptive tactics by the state in a bid to undercut the profits accrued as a result
of criminal behaviour.
Notwithstanding these considerable developments in the post-trial context, various
factors ensure that the measures introduced by the legislature remain circumscribed. The
judiciary's strident protection of its independence, coupled with its reluctance to provide
sentencing guidelines, has allowed the flexible structure of sentencing in Ireland to be
retained, thereby mitigating the more punitive tendencies of the legislature. This capacity of
the judiciary to counterbalance the trend towards a crime control model of criminal justice
is evident from the widespread application of the exceptional circumstances caveat to
presumptive sentences. Similarly, whilst the DPP may request a review of unduly lenient
sentences, the courts require the satisfaction of strict criteria before an appeal is entertained.
Thus, the legislature's predilection for more punitive measures is tempered by the courts and
by the enduring strength of the traditional structures and principles in place.
Increasing legislative intervention is evident in the post-trial realm, which impinges on
the usual discretion accorded to judges. The growing desire of the legislature to intervene
in the traditional role of the judiciary seems to be founded on a broader distrust of the
judiciary, given its apparent "failure" to apply presumptive sentences,1 14 and the perception
that the courts are unduly lenient, 115 a perception which is demonstrably ill-founded given
the sustained levels of imprisonment. However, it is evident that "potentially grave damage"
could be caused to the administration of justice unless the public expectation that sentences
be "coherent, rational and consistent" is met. 116 One possible means of ensuring more
113 See Comptroller and Auditor General, The Probation and lf'fare Service: Report on value for mong exantinaton
(Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2004), p. 21 and M Seymour, Alternatives to Custody in Ireland (Dublin:
Business in the Community and the Irish Penal Reform Trust, 2006), p. 6.
114 The Minister for Justice claimed that "the people of Ireland are strongly of the view that these penalties Ifor
drugs offences] are appropriate". Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, "Address by \n Tanaiste
to the Annual Delegate Conference of the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors" (Press Relcasc),
2 April 2007.
11 \ recent police survey concluded that 82 per cent believed that the criminal justice system's treatment of
offenders is too lenient, up from 74 per cent in 2002. P Kennedy and C Browne, Garda PublicAttides Sun
2006 (Tipperary: Garda Research Unit, 2006), p. 51. A figure of 81 per cent was also recorded in an Irish
Independent/IMS poll of 2002. Sce "Crime battle is lost", Irish Independent, 6 May 2002.
116 Ddil Debates, 22 March 2007, vol. 34, col. 383 per Minister for Justice, Mr McDowell.
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consistency and thereby increasing public confidence11 7 without impinging unjustifiably on
judicial discretion would be to devise sentencing guidelines: as a system of objective
guidance for sentencing judges; 118 or by the development of "guideline judgments" by the
superior courts where a number of appeals concerning the same offence would be heard
together and the judgment would indicate the approximate mid-point on the scale of
severity and the factors that warrant movement from this point.119 Moreover, as Tonry has
suggested, guidelines aim to achieve consistent treatment of comparable offenders and are
scaled to offence severity, and therefore may in fact assist in proportionality in
sentencing.120 The imposition of sentencing guidelines rather than presumptive sentences
represents an apposite way of reconciling the conflicting demands of both legislative and
judicial restraint in the post-trial stage of the criminal justice system.
117 A Ashworth and N1 Hough, "Sentencing and the climate of opinion" (1996) CriminalLnv, Reiew 776, 781; Lau,
Reform Cormmission, Consultation Paper on Sentencng (Dublin: Law Reform Commission, 1993), pp. 61-2.
118 Working Group on the Junsdiction of the Courts, The Crn ina/]iisdicdon of the Courts (Dublin: Courts Scrx ice,
2003), p. 20.
119 BCLRG, Final Report (n. 75 above), p. 227.
120 M 'onry, "Parochialism in US sentencing policy" (1999) 45 Cnrne and Dehinque 7 48, 59.

